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UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS: REJECTION OF
ASSOCIATIONAL IMMUNITY FROM TORT LIABILITY
TO MEMBERS
T HE recent decision of the California Supreme Court in Marshall
v. International Longshoremen's Union- constitutes the first re-
jection of the generally recognized rule that an unincorporated
association2 is immune from tort liability to its members.
In the Marshall case, an active member of an unincorporated
labor union brought an action against the union and two of its
officers to recover damages for personal injuries suffered when he fell
over an obstruction in a parking lot owned and maintained by the
union. Plaintiff alleged negligence of the defendants in maintaining
the parking lot and in failing to warn him of or guard him from
the hazardous obstruction. The union moved for summary judg-
ment, asserting its immunity from suit by virtue of its unincorporated
status and plaintiff's membership at the date of the injury. The trial
-court granted the union's motion for summary judgment and the
District Court of Appeal affirmed.3
On appeal the Supreme Court of California reversed, unani-
mously holding that the plaintiff was entitled to sue the unincorpo-
rated union as an entity for injuries sustained as the result of the
alleged negligent acts which he did not authorize and in which he
1371 P.2d 987, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1962), reversing 17 Cal. Rptr. 343 (Dist. Ct
of Appeal 1961). This was the first judicial determination of the right of a member
of an unincorporated association in California to sue his association for personal
injuries resulting from the negligence of its agent.
This decision was followed in Inglis v. Operating Eng'rs Union, 878 P.2d 467, 23
Cal. Rptr. 408 (1962), affirming 18 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Dist. Ct of Appeal 1961), in which
the California Supreme Court sustained the right of a member to maintain an action
against his unincorporated union for injuries received from an assault and battery
by union officials and members while attending a regular union meeting.
2 A frequently quoted definition of an unincorporated association is that it is a body
of persons acting together, without a charter, but in a manner of incorporated bodies,
for the purpose of some common enterprise. Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 157
(1924).
Examples of unincorporated associations include joint stock associations, syndicates,
partnerships, college fraternity chapters, political parties, chambers of commerce, trade
associations, women's dubs, professional dubs and societies, and local units of such
organizations as labor unions, the American Legion, and other social and fraternal
orders. As the list of examples above indicates, unincorporated associations may be
organized not only to conduct business but also for social, literary, political, religious,
scientific, professional, charitable, and an undefined number of other purposes. 4
Ahr. JuR. Associations & Clubs § 2 (1986); 11 U. Prr L.  v. 808 (1950).
2 17 Cal. Rptr. 343 (Dist. Ct of Appeal 1961).
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did not Iparticipate.4 The court, however, expressly limited its
holding to unincorporated labor unions, "leaving to the future the
development of rules to be applied to other types of unincorporated
associations."5
In holding that the member could bring a neligence action
against his unincorporated union as an entity, the court pointed out
that the generally recognized associational immunity from such
actions rests upon two considerations. These considerations are the
non-entity character of the unincorporated association and the opera-
tion of the principle of respondeat superior making each member
liable as a principal for the acts of the association's officers and
agents.7 The court indicated, however, that these two foundations
have been progressively undermined by both federal and state court
decisions.
,'The court also held that any judgment- which the plaintiff-member might recover
should be satisfied solely from the funds and property of the unincorporated
association. 371 P.2d at 991, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
rId. at 991 n. 1, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 215 n. 1.
6In the briefs filed in the District Court of Appeal, the plaintiff-appellant con-
tended that a minority view denying such immunity existed and cited Saltsman v.
Shults, 21 N.Y. (14 Hun.) 256 (Sup. Ct. 1878); Gillette v. Allen, 269 App. Div. 441, 56
N.Y.S.2d 307 (1945); and United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 160 Tex. 203, 328
S.V.2d 739 (1959) as supporting cases. Brief for Appellant, p. 7, Marshall v. Inter-
national Longshoremen's Union, 17 Cal. Rptr. 343 (Dist. Ct. of Appeal 1961). Re-
spondent sought to distinguish these cases on their factual situations. Brief for
Respondent, pp. 12-13. The District Court of- Appeal accepted the respondent's dis-
tinctions; the California Supreme Court did not mention either the supposed minority
cases or the respondents attempted distinctions.
The two New York cases involved negligence actions against unincorporated joint
stock associations which were covered by a special statute treating them as if they
were incorporated entities. This statute had been previously interpreted as sufficiently
inclusive to permit suit by shareholder associates. Westcott v. Fargo, 61 N.Y. (16
Sickles) 542 (1875).
The court in .Borden distinguished between negligence and an intentional tort
and allowed suit by a member who had suffered injury from an intentional wrong
by a union agent which was ratified by the defendant union. It added in dicta that
the member could not have recovered for negligence alone. Texas courts support
the general associational immunity. Atkinson v. Thompson, 311 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.
.Civ. App. 1958).
7Because the unincorporated association is regarded as an aggregate rather than as
an entity separate and distinct from its membership, any agent employed by the
group is not technically the agent of the association but is the agent of each of the
members who compose the association. As a principal for the agent, each member
'is thus answerable for the tortious conduct of the agent. If the agent's tortious
conduct should injure a member of the association, that member is barred from
suing the other association members by the imputation of the common agent's negli-
.gence to him as well as to all the other member-principals. The effect of the imputa-
tion of the agent's negligence is to make the injured member guilty of contributory
negligence. Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 473-74 (1950).
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The first breakthrough came in United Mine Workers v. Coro-
nado Coal Co.,8 in which the Supreme Court held that a labor union
was suable as an entity in the federal courts for the tortious acts of
its members and agents, despite its unincorporated status and the
absence of a federal statutory provision expressly authorizing such
a suit.0 Thereafter, another Supreme Court decision restricted the
strict application of the doctrine of respondeat superior by holding
that civil liability for the wrongful acts of the union or its agents
could only be imposed upon those members who either personally
authorized or participated in the tortious conduct.1 0 A similar
development occurred in the state courts, both in the treatment of
unincorporated unions as entities for a variety of purposes"t and in
the limitation of the liability of members for the torts of the union
officers and agents.m 2
The court in the instant case also relied upon policy factors to
support its departure from the general rule of associational immunity.
It noted that many unincorporated associations presently conduct
their day-by-day operations and affairs through elected officials and
employed agents over whom the individual members have little or
no control. It referred to judicial decisions which recognize that
with the frequent separation of membership and management which
8259 U.S. 314 (1922).
*A similar decision was reached in England two decades earlier in Taff Vale Ry.
v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants, [1901] A.C. 426.
a, United States v. White, 332 U.S. 694 (1944).
II See e.g., Mooney v. Bartenders Union, 48 Cal. 2d 841, 313 P.2d 857 (1957) (union
treated as corporation for purpose of member's inspection of financial records); De
Mille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 81 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948) (member dues and assessments become association prop.
erty alone); Oil Workers v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512, 280 P.2d 71 (1951)
(union as entity found guilty of contempt for violating temporary restraining order);
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Kiser, 174 Va. 229, 6 S.E.2d 562 (1939) (union
constitution recognized as binding contract between members and union as entity);
Local 261, UAW v. Schulze, 3 Wis. 2d 479, 89 N.W.2d 191 (1958) (union as entity
allowed to sue member to collect unpaid dues).
22See e.g., Sullivan v. Barrows, 303 Mass. 197, 21 N.E.2d 275 (1939); Michaels v.
Hillman, 112 Misc. 395, 183 N.Y. Supp. 195 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Moore v. District 50,
UlMWi, 131 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1954); Fray v. Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W.2d 782 (1960).
In determining the liability of members for the acts of an association agent, courts
distinguish between commercial unincorporated associations and voluntary, non-
profit associations. Members of a commercial association are liable as partners, while
the liability of members of a non-profit association is governed by agency principles.
Thomas v. Dunne, 131 Colo. 20, 279 P.2d 427 (1955); Azzolina v. Order of Sons of
Italy, 119 Conn. 681, 179 Ad. 201 (1935); Stone v. Guth, 232 Mo. App. 217, 102
S.W.2d 738 (1937). See BAL.LENrsN, CoaRoPrboNs § 2a (rev. ed. 1946).
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exists in many unincorporated associations, especially labor unions,13
the individual members are not in any true sense principals of the
union officers and agents and thus should not be personally bound
by their acts.
The court further noted that legislatures and courts in recent
years have increasingly regarded unincorporated associations as "de
facto" entities for some purposes.14 It also mentioned the con-
tinuity of many modem associations despite changes in their mem-
bership and the organized, institutional activity in which they engage
as additional factors demonstrating their status as an entity, from .
practical standpoint. Moreover, there often exists in these institur
tional associations a group or organizational interest which is dis-
tinguishable from the individual interests of the members,15 just
1 3 For factual situations to which this principle is relevant, see United Mine Workers
v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); McClees v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng'rs, 59 Ohio App. 477, 18 N.E.2d 812 (1938).
U At common law an unincorporated association has no entity or existence inde"
pendent of its members and may not sue or be sued in its common name. BAr-
LANTnIN, CORPOaAloNs §2a (rev. ed. 1946). Enabling statutes in many jurisdictions
and Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have altered that situation
and now allow an unincorporated association to engage in litigation in its own name.
The state enabling statutes show great diversity in their provisions. See, e.g., CoNri.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §52-76 (1960); N.J. REv. STAT. §2A:64-1 (1951); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-69.1 (Supp. 1961); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1745.01 (Page Supp. 1962); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. I § 128 (1958). These statutes have been interpreted to be solely procedural
in nature and not to establish any substantive liability of the associations to their
members. Huth v. Humboldt Staum, 61 Conn. 227, 23 Atl. 1084 (1891); Koogler v.
Koogler, 127 Ohio St. 57, 186 N.E. 725 (1933). The Connecticut statute is unique in
that it expressly provides that a member shall be able to bring suit against his un-
incorporated association. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-76 (1960).
The California statut6ry provision provides: "When two or more persons, associ.
ated in any business, transact such business under a common name,.., the associ.
ates may be sued by such common name,... CAL CV. PROC. CODE § 388. Although
restricted to business associations, the statute has been interpreted to embrace a variety
of enterprises, including labor unions. Armstrong v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. 841,
159 Pac 1176 (1916).
For a general discussion of unincorporated associations in California, including a
suggested statutory change to allow these associations to sue in their own name, see
89 CALiF. L. REv. 264 (1951); 35 CAraF. L. Rnv. 115 (1947).
Section 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) further
exemplifies the recognition of some unincorporated associations as entities by pro-
viding for a suit by or against an unincorporated labor union in the federal courts
for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without regard for the jurisdictional
amount or the citizenship of the parties involved. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (a) (1958).
"I,Structurally and functionally, a labor union is an institution which involves more
than the private or personal interests of its members." United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 701 (1944). Accord, United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S.
344, 385 (1922); DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 149, 187
P.2d 769, 776 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948). Cf., Superior Engraving
Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 783, 795 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 930 (1951),
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as the interest of the corporation is distinguishable from that of its
shareholders. Referring to labor unions, the court declared that
unincorporated associations can "approximate corporations in their
methods of operation and powers."'' 6 Evidence of such an approxi-
mation may be seen in the comprehensive political activity, complex
internal organizational hierachy, extensive ownership of real and
personal property, independent financial status resulting from accum-
ulated and invested funds, and other manifestations of the practical
power possessed by some present-day unincorporated associations.
Although the court left them unarticulated, at least two additional
policy factors support a rejection of the associational immunity. The
first is the anomaly which exists under such an immunity, whereby
the association is liable to a non-member 7 but not to a member
although both parties are injured -at the same time by the same
tortious act of an association's agent. Reality seems to be disregarded
when recovery from the association is denied one of the two injured
parties upon the fiction that the injured member was a co-principal
engaged in a joint enterprise and consequently is barred by imputed
negligence from suing the other co-principals in their collective
capacity for the tort of a common agent I8 Courts have long held
concluding that the Supreme Court cases now establish that "the entity of the associa-
tion [union] is as much separate and apart from the individual members as that of
a corporation is from its stockholders."
2t Oil Workers v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512, 571, 230 P.2d- 71, 106
(1951).
% Unincorporated associations ar& required to exercise the same care to avoid
injury to others as are corporations and individuals. Feldman v. North British :
Mercantile Ins. Co., 187 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1943); Pandolfo v. Bank of Benson, 27,9
Fed. 48 (9th Cir. 1921); 4Am. JuR. Associations & Clubs § 43 (1936).
1SYet courts have consistently classified the unincorporated association as a joint
enterprise, at least for purposes of negligence suits by its members, and have denied
recovery to the injured member on the conceptualistic reasoning stated above. For
decisions from all the American jurisdictions which have sustained the associationat
immunity from negligence to its members, see Goins v. Missouri Pac. Sys. Fed'n of
Maintenance Employees, 272 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1959); Gilbert v. Crystal Fountain
Lodge, 80 Ga. 284, 4 S.E. 905 (1887); Martin v. Northern Pac. Beneficial Ass'n, 68
Minn. 521, 71 N.V. 701 (1897); Marchitto v. Central R.R., 9 N.J. 456, 88 A.2d 851
(1952); Koogler v. Koogler, 127 Ohio St. 57, 186 N.E. 725 (1933); fDe Villars v.
Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A.2d 333 (1950); Atkinson v. Thompson, 311 S.V.2d 250
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Duplis v. Rutland Aerie, 118 Vt. 438, I1l A.2d 727 (1955);
Carr v. Northern Pac. Beneficial Ass'n, 128 Wash. 40, 221 Pac. 979 (1924); Hromek v.
Gemeinde, 238 Wis. 204, 298 N.NV. 587 (1941).
As may be seen, less than a dozen jurisdictions have passed upon the question of
the member's right to recover from his unincorporated association for injuries re-
sulting from the negligence of an association agent, and an even smaller number
have decided the issue when a union member and his unincorporated labor union
were involved.
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that an unincorporated association should properly bear the risk
that its officer or agent may injure an outside party.19 Once the con-
cept of the unincorporated association as a joint enterprise lacking
a separate entity is rejected, there is no valid reason why the associa-
tion should not similarly bear the risk that its officer or agent may
injure a member.
A second factor which the court did not discuss is the availability
of liability insurance at a reasonable cost to the association. 20 The
denial to the association of immunity from suit by its members for
the negligence of its agents thus works no undue financial hardship
upon the association.21 Moreover, the association is in a more ad-
vantageous position than the individual member to guard against
the negligence of its agent by means of insurance. It would there-
fore seem to accomplish sound and desirable results to make the
association responsible to its members for the tortious conduct of its
agents.
In addition to its rejection of a generally accepted rule of associa-
tional law, the Marshall case is significant for several other reasons.
It is apparently the first American decision according to a member
of an unincorporated association a status equivalent to that of an
outside party for purposes of suing the association for a breach of a
common duty,22 such as the duty to maintain the premises and
19 See note 17 supra.
20 It is now well established that administration of risk is an important element in
the determination of liability. See PROSSER, ToRTs § 62 (2d ed. 1955); Douglas,
Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk 1, 38 YALm L.J. 584-85 (1929).
=It is probable that many unincorporated associations already carry liability in-
surance to protect their assets from judgments in favor of non-members. The increase
in the number of people who might recover judgments against the association would
likely result in only a modest increase in the annual insurance premium. The cost
of insurance to guard against the torts of its agents would seem a proper cost of
-operation which should be borne by the association in return for the legal privileges
:accorded to it, especially when the alternative is that an innocent member might
not be compensated for an injury. For a discussion of this point, see 13 STAN. L. REV.
123, 126 (1960).
"This distinction between the common and personal duty owed by an un-
incorporated association to its members was apparently first articulated in Fray v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W.2d 782 (1960). The Wisconsin
court there allowed suit by a member against his union for financial injuries resulting
from negligent representation. It spoke of a personal duty owed to the member
by reason of his membership and the function of the union in the collective bargaining
process.
The Wisconsin court distinguished this personal duty from a common duty like
that involved in Hromek v. Gemeinde, 288 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941) where
recovery from the union was denied a union member injured from the negligent
maintenance of the meeting hall by union officials. The court in Hromek said that
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equipment of the association in a safe condition. A few liberal
courts have previously limited the general rule of associational im-
munity by permitting suit against labor unions by members who
were financially injured by the wrongful conduct of a union agent
in the performance of certain administrative proceedings in the
collective bargaining process.P This development has allowed
actions by members of labor unions for what the courts term a
breach of a personal duty24 owed individually to the member solely
because of his associational membership, such as the duty to promptly
and properly register the member's grievance with the employer
or to request arbitration for the member's alleged unlawful dis-
charge. However, it has not altered the general associational im-
munity from suit for tortious conduct of its agents which is not
of this special character. The Marshall opinion contains no mention
of this distinction between the personal and common duty owed by
the association to its members. It would thus appear that the court
intended for unincorporated labor unions to respond in damages
for any injury, physical or financial, suffered by.a member as the
result of any negligence of an association agent.
The Marshall decision is also significant because it limited, the
member's recovery from the association to the funds and assets held
by the association. 25 If an injured member is to assert the quasi-
the negligent acts committed by the union officials were done as much for the benefit
of the plaintiff-member as for any of the other union members and that the plaintiff
thus could not sue her co-principals for the derelictions of a common agent.
By resorting to this distinction in the character of duty, the court in Fray was
able to afford a remedy to an innocent injured member without openly repudiating
Hromeh.
21 Compare Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, supra note 22 (negligent repre-
sentation) and United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 160 Tex. 208, 328 S.W2d 739
(1959) (intentional tort of agent while acting adverse to member's interest) with
Marchitto v. Central R.R., 9 N.J. 456, 88 A.2d 851 (1952) and Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Allen, 280 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), cert. denied, 340 US.
934 (1951), for recovery by member on tort theory.
Recovery may be sustained on the theory that the union has undertaken a
contractual obligation to represent the member in dealings with the employer.
Glover v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 250 N.C. 35, 108 S.E.2d 78 (1959). Cf., Bonsor
v. Musicians' Union, [1956] A.C. 104.
For dicta to the effect that a union ought to be liable to a member for its arbi-
trary, negligent, or bad faith conduct in representing or failing to represent him in
employment relations, see Guszkowski v. United States Trucking Corp., 162 F. Supp.
247 (D.N.J. 1958); Jenkins v. Wim. Schluderburg-T.J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144
A.2d 88 (1958); Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y-2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577
(1959).
2'LSee note 22 .suPra.
" Such a holding is of itself another manifestation of the judicial recognition of
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corporate status of the association as the basis for allowing him to sue
it as an entity, it seems reasonable that he should likewise be bound
by the limited liability characteristic of corporateness and be allowed
to look only to the association assets in satisfaction of his judg-
ment.2 -
- In conclusion, the California court's rejection of the associa-
tional immunity as applied to unincorporated labor unions seems
justified and in keeping with the practical realities of the association
involved. By expressly limiting its decision to unincorporated labor
unions, the court left unanswered the question of which, if any, other
unincorporated associations will hereafter be held liable for negli-
gence to their members. The current judicial trends noted in the
reasoning of the instant case, the supporting policy factors, and
the nature of many modem unincorporated associations demand an
extension of the Marshall holding to those unincorporated associa-
tions which have operational and organizational characteristics simi-
lar to those of unions: i.e., continuity, separation of membership and
management, extensive associational activity conducted by employed
agents, a distinguishable associational interest, accumulated financial
resources, and an available means of shifting the financial burden
of adverse judgments through liability insurance.
unincorporated associations as entities. At common law there could be no impositon
of collective liability upon the association because of its non-entity character, and the
individual members were severally liable for the entire amount of any judgment
recovered by a third party. Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 132 F.2d
408, 410 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1943); Pandolfo v. Bank of
Benson, 273 Fed. 48 (9th Cir. 1921); Comment, Unions as Juridical Persons, 66 YArz
L.J. 712, 727 (1957).
Collective liability has been imposed upon unincorporated associations both by
judicial decision and by statutory enactment. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 391 (1922); Thomas v. Dunne, 131 Colo. 20, 31, 279
P.2d 427, 432 (1955); Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301 (b) ,
61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (b) (1958); CAL. CIV. PRoo. CODE § 388; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-69.1 (Supp. 1961).
20Accord, Lyons v. American Legion Post Realty Co., 172 Ohio St. 331, 175 N.E.2d
733 (1961); Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 639, 101 N.W2.d 782,
786 (1960) (dictum).
Statutes in some jurisdictions expressly provide that a judgment against an un-
incorporated association sued as an entity can only be enforced against the association
and cannot be satisfied from the property of the individual members. OHIO Rxv.
CODE ANN. § 1745.02 (Page Supp. 1962); contra, N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:64-4 (1951).
The Marshall decision affords the injured member an election of remedies, for he
can proceed either against the association or the individual wrongdoing agent. Where
an association has limited assets and has not secured liability insurance coverage, it may
be more advantageous for the member to sue the agent rather than the association.
However, since the association is likely to have more extensive financial resources than
the individual agent, the right to sue the association makes it more probable that an
injured member will actually receive satisfaction of any judgment entered for him.
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